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59 Maiden Lane
New York, New York 10038
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The Air Group, Inc.
1Garth, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Ray Gary (“Gary”), a New Jersey resident,
brought an action against Appellee The Air Group, Inc. (“The
Air Group”), a California corporation, alleging a violation of
New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A.
§ 34:19-1 et seq. (“CEPA”).  The District Court, holding that
Gary’s state law whistleblower claim was preempted by the
federal Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (“ADA”),
as amended by the Whistleblower Protection Program, 49
U.S.C. § 42121 (“WPP”), dismissed Gary’s action pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  After considering
Gary’s appeal, we will reverse.
I.
The facts of this case are largely undisputed.  From
March 15, 2001 through August 30, 3001, Ray Gary was
employed by The Air Group as a co-pilot for the “Cessna
2Citation,” a small private aircraft.  In July 2001, The Air Group
hired James O’Neal Johnson, Jr. as pilot-in-command for the
Cessna Citation.
Gary spent four days assisting Johnson with preparations
for a Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) required “route
check.”  After spending that time with Johnson, Gary alleges
that he believed Johnson was unqualified to pilot an aircraft
because he: (1) did not have the requisite jet time mandated by
the FAA, (2) was unfamiliar with FAA mandated basic flight
procedures, (3) did not properly proceed with the FAA
mandated “Pre-Flight Checklist,” a safety measure, (4) was
unfamiliar with the airspace into which he was planning to fly,
and (5) was unfamiliar with how to obtain departure clearance
at certain airports.
Based on the foregoing, Gary alleges that he reasonably
believed that if The Air Group permitted Johnson to fly and/or
3if he did so, Johnson would be endangering himself, passengers,
crew, the public and the aircraft.  Gary also alleges he believed
Johnson had violated and/or would violate FAA regulations.
On August 30, 2001, Gary called his supervisor, Dennis
Turville, to express his concerns.  Gary told Turville that
Johnson was “ill-prepared, lacked ability, lacked the proper
credentials, lacked the required experience, was unsafe and
unqualified to pilot a commercial charter plane.”  A few hours
later, The Air Group terminated Gary.  Gary alleges that The
Air Group fired him in retaliation for, among other things, his
report of Johnson’s lack of qualifications as well as Johnson’s
past and potential future FAA violations.
On April 29, 2002, Gary filed a complaint in the
Superior Court of New Jersey alleging that his termination was
in violation of New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee
1  That provision states, in relevant part:
An employer shall not take any
retaliatory action against an
employee because the employee
does any of the following:
a.  Discloses, or threatens to
disclose to a supervisor or to a
public body an activity, policy or
practice of the employer or another
employer, with whom there is a
business relationship, that the
employee reasonably believes is in
violation of a law, or a rule or
regulation promulgated pursuant to
law, or, in the case of an employee
who is a licensed or certified health
care professional, reasonably
believes constitutes improper
quality of patient care
N.J.S.A. 34:19-3.
4
Protection Act (“CEPA”), a state whistleblower statute.1
On May 29, 2002, The Air Group removed the case to
the District of New Jersey pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.  It then
2  Gary initially brought his appeal pro se.  On November
10, 2003, based on a finding that the “issues are arguable and
complex,” this Court appointed pro bono counsel for Gary.
5
moved to dismiss Gary’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the ground that his state law
whistleblower claim was preempted by federal law, specifically
the ADA, 49 U.S.C. § 41713, as amended by the WPP, 49
U.S.C. § 42121.
The District Court granted The Air Group’s motion to
dismiss on August 8, 2002.  This timely appeal followed.2
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction over Gary’s state law
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332.  We have
jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291.  We exercise plenary review over a district court’s
dismissal of a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
612(b)(6).  Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 164
F.3d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1998).  In reviewing this appeal, we
apply the same test as the District Court, accepting all of Gary’s
allegations as true and construing all reasonable inferences in
his favor.  See Port Authority of N.Y. & N.J. v. Arcadian Corp.
et al., 189 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 1999).  
III.
Congress enacted the ADA in 1978 to “prevent the states
from re-regulating airline operations so that competitive market
forces could function.”  Taj Mahal Travel, 164 F.3d at 194
(citation omitted).  The ADA was intended to increase
competition among air carriers.  In addition, it contains an
express preemption clause, which provides in relevant part that:
[A] State . . . may not enact or
enforce a law, regulation, or other
provision having the force and
effect of law related to a price,
route, or service of an air carrier
7that may provide air transportation
under this subpart.
49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
The Supreme Court has given a broad interpretation to
the words “relating to,” holding that “[s]tate enforcement
actions having a connection with, or reference to airline ‘rates,
routes, or services’ are pre-empted.”  Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1992).  The requisite
connection exists either where “the law expressly references the
air carrier’s prices, routes or services, or has a forbidden
significant effect upon the same.”  United Parcel Serv., Inc. v.
Flores-Galarza, 318 F.3d 323, 335 (1st Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted).  At the same time, however, the Supreme Court has
indicated that there are “real limitations to the [ADA’s]
preemptive scope, stating . . . ‘[s]ome state actions may affect
[airline fares] in too tenuous, remote or peripheral a manner to
8have preemptive effect.’” Taj Mahal Travel, 164 F.3d at 191
(quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 390) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In the present appeal no claim is made that the ADA
elements of “price” or “route” are involved.  The dispute centers
around whether Gary’s state law retaliation claim has a
“forbidden significant effect” upon The Air Group’s “service.”
In other words, whether Gary’s claim for retaliatory discharge
under New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act,
N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 et seq., is “related to” the “service of an air
carrier.”  49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).  Neither the Supreme Court
nor our sister circuits have defined the term “service of an air
carrier” in the context of an employee calling the attention of
his employer to the safety qualifications of a co-worker.
In 2000, Congress enacted the Whistleblower Protection
Program as an amendment to the ADA.  That statute, which is
9the federal airline analog to the New Jersey whistleblower
statute, provides in relevant part:
No air carrier . . . may discharge an
employee or otherwise discriminate
against an employee with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because
the employee . . . provided . . . to
the employer  or  Federal
Government information relating to
any violation or alleged violation
of any order, regulation, or
standard of the Federal Aviation
Administration or any other
provision of Federal law relating to
air carrier safety under this subtitle
or any other law of the United
States.
49 U.S.C. § 42121(a)(1). 
We must therefore determine whether the ADA, as
amended by the WPP, preempts Gary’s claim under the New
Jersey whistleblower statute.  To do so requires us to answer
two related questions.  First, is Gary’s claim “related to a . . .
3  Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc. was filed by the
Eleventh Circuit on August 21, 2003.  The District Court,
which granted The Air Group’s motion to dismiss Gary’s claim,
did so on August 8, 2002 – a year before Branche was filed.
We recognize that the District Court did not have the benefit of
the Eleventh Circuit’s Branche opinion when it decided The Air
Group’s motion.
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service of an air carrier” within the express terms of the ADA
preemption provision?  Second, does the WPP alter the scope
of the ADA preemption provision such that Gary’s claim now
falls within its ambit?
In the post-WPP era, the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits
have both weighed in on the viability of state law whistleblower
claims in the aviation context.  See Branche v. Airtran Airways,
Inc., 342 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003)3; Botz v. Omni Air Int’l,
286 F.3d 488 (8th Cir. 2002).  As these cases provide the
framework for the parties’ arguments on appeal, they are
discussed in detail below.
4  Omni assigned Botz to work both legs of a round-trip
flight from Alaska to Japan.  Botz believed this assignment
would require her to violate a Federal Aviation Regulation
limiting a flight attendant’s “duty period” to no longer than
twenty hours.  See 14 C.F.R. § 121.467.
5  The New Jersey statute, N.J.S.A. § 34:19-1 et seq.,
contains the identical “refusal” provision at issue in Botz.
However, that provision is not implicated in the present appeal.
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1. Botz v. Omni Air International
Omni Air International, Inc. terminated Anna Botz’s
employment as a flight attendant after she refused a flight
assignment that she believed violated federal safety
regulations.4  Botz then filed suit alleging Omni violated
Minnesota’s whistleblower statute5 by discharging her in
retaliation for refusing the assignment and for reporting the
alleged safety violation to Omni.  Omni moved to dismiss the
action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that the state
whistleblower provisions were both expressly and impliedly
12
preempted by the ADA and WPP.  The district court granted the
motion and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
On appeal, the court focused on the fact that Botz, a
flight attendant, refused to fly as assigned: “When applied to the
facts surrounding Botz’s discharge, the Minnesota
whistleblower statute has a forbidden connection with air-
carrier services.  It includes broad authorization to flight
attendants to refuse assignments, jeopardizing an air carrier’s
ability to complete its scheduled flights.”  Botz, 286 F.3d at 494.
The court held that Botz’s claim was expressly preempted by
the ADA based on its conclusion that “[t]he Minnesota
whistleblower statute affects air-carrier service by authorizing
a flight attendant to refuse assignments and protecting her when
she does.”  Id. at 495.
The Eighth Circuit then turned to the impact of the WPP
on ADA preemption.  It found that “[t]he fact that the WPP
13
now provides a comprehensive scheme for protecting the
precise sort of air safety-related conduct Botz engaged in here,
is . . . powerful evidence of Congress’s clear and manifest intent
to pre-empt state-law whistleblower claims related to air
safety.”  Id. at 496.  Thus, it concluded that “[w]hile the plain
language of the ADA’s pre-emption provision encompasses
Botz’s claims, the WPP makes it unmistakable that such claims
are pre-empted.”  Id. at 498.
2. Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc.
Branche was employed as an aircraft inspector for
Airtran.  He was required to conduct safety inspections of
aircraft prior to takeoff.  Branche alleged that he was terminated
after he reported several alleged safety violations to the FAA.
In particular, Branche alleged that on one occasion an Airtran
plane landed with one of its engines running at a temperature
that exceeded FAA safety guidelines.  Branche recommended
14
to Airtran’s maintenance supervisor that the engine be subjected
to a detailed inspection but he was overruled and the plane
subsequently took off.
Branche brought suit under Florida’s Whistleblower Act.
After discovery, Airtran moved for summary judgment arguing
that Branche’s state law claim was expressly preempted by the
ADA.  The District Court granted the motion but the Court of
Appeals reversed.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted that “employment
discrimination actions typically have been held to fall outside
the scope of the ADA’s pre-emption clause.”  Branche, 342
F.3d at 1259 (citations omitted).  It concluded that “given the
particularities of Branche’s claim that he was discharged for his
post hoc reporting of Airtran’s safety violations, we believe that
this case is more analogous to the majority of those
[employment discrimination claims].” Id. at 1260.  Notably, the
15
court did not “dispute the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion that the
grounding of an airplane is related to services.”  Id. at 1262.
Rather, it found “in this case, the connection – or, indeed, the
potential connection – between Branche’s actions and air carrier
services is far more attenuated than in Botz.”  Id. 
Turning to the impact of the WPP, the Eleventh Circuit
disagreed with the expansive effect given to that provision by
the Eighth Circuit.  The Branche court emphasized the fact that
the WPP “says nothing about preemption” and found that
silence “ambiguous” as to Congressional intent regarding
preemption of state law whistleblower claims.  Id. at 1263.  It
thus concluded that “the WPP changed neither the nature of
Florida’s Whistleblower Act nor the language of the ADA’s
pre-emption provision in any meaningful way.”  Id. at 1264.
Rather, “[i]n deciding pre-emption, whether before or after the
. . . WPP, the question we must answer remains the same: Is the
16
state law in question ‘related to’ air carrier ‘services’?”  Id.
Because Branche’s claim was not, it was not preempted by the
ADA.
Here, as we have noted, see note 3 supra, the District
Court dismissed Gary’s case prior to the filing of the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision in Branche and thus did not have the benefit
of that court’s analysis.  Instead, the District Court, adopting the
reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in Botz, determined that the
ADA’s express preemption provision was significantly
expanded by the WPP amendment and as such held that Gary’s
state law claim was preempted.
IV.
On appeal, Gary urges the Court to follow Branche
and hold that the ADA does not preempt his state law claim
because his claim is not “related to” The Air Group’s
6  However the “service” component of the ADA is
interpreted, see, e.g., Taj Mahal Travel, 164 F.3d at 194 (“[W]e
do not find it conceptually helpful to distinguish ‘operation or
maintenance of aircraft’ from ‘service.’”); Branche, 342 F.3d at
1256-58, Gary’s complaint and the actions allegedly taken by
him cannot be deemed to be related to the “service of an air
carrier.”  This is particularly so in light of the ADA’s primarily
economic focus.  See Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d
363, 368 (3d Cir. 1999) (describing the ADA as an “economic
deregulation statute”).
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“service.”6  He further contends that the Court should adopt
the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis that the addition of the WPP
did not expand the scope of the ADA’s preemption provision.
1. Express Preemption
We hold Gary’s claim is not expressly preempted by
the ADA because its connection to The Air Group’s “service
of an air carrier”, actual or potential, is simply too remote and
too attenuated to fall within the scope of the ADA, 49 U.S.C.
§ 41713(b)(1).  Gary’s claim is predicated on a complaint to
his supervisors about Johnson’s qualifications and his
18
“reasonabl[e] belie[f] that Mr. Johnson would violate and/or
had violated Federal Aviation Administration Regulations.” 
Compl. at ¶ 6.  Unlike Botz, Gary never refused a work
assignment, and thus his report to The Air Group about
Johnson did not have the potential to interrupt service by
grounding a particular flight.  
Indeed, the relation of Gary’s whistleblower report to
“service” is even more attenuated than Branche’s reports. 
Gary’s actions did not interrupt any scheduled flights, nor did
they have the potential to ground any scheduled flights, for
the simple reason that no flights were scheduled.  Instead,
Gary’s actions are more properly viewed as comparable to a
garden variety employment claim, albeit in the present
context, one that is related to safety. 
2. Impact of the WPP on ADA Preemption
The Air Group’s principal argument on appeal, and the
19
basis upon which the District Court rendered its decision, is
that the addition of the WPP expanded the scope of the ADA
preemption provision to encompass state law whistleblower
claims.  The Botz court analyzed the WPP to that effect.  Botz
herself argued that the WPP “was not intended to pre-empt
State whistleblower protections because, if it had been,
Congress could easily have made such preemption express by
including language in the WPP indicating that it was a
whistleblowing air-carrier employee’s exclusive remedy.” 
Botz, 286 F.3d at 497.  The Botz court rejected this argument,
claiming that “[t]his turns proper logic on its head.”  Id.  It
held that while the plain language of the ADA’s preemption
provision encompassed Botz’s claims, the WPP “made it
unmistakable that such claims are preempted.”  Id. at 498.
While Botz sets forth its interpretation of the WPP, we
find the better view is that expressed by the Eleventh Circuit
20
in Branche – the WPP did not alter the ADA analysis in any
meaningful way.  Two factors support this conclusion.  
First, the plain language of the WPP is wholly silent
on the issue of preemption.  In enacting the WPP, Congress
presumably was aware of the view of a majority of courts that
the ADA did not preempt state law retaliatory discharge
claims.  See Branche, 342 F.3d at 1262.  Thus, we agree with
the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that Congress’ silence
renders its intent “ambiguous” at best and thus should not
serve as a basis for expanding ADA preemption.  See id.
Second, our holding is reinforced by the well-
established principle that “courts should not lightly infer pre-
emption.”  Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491
(1987).  This is particularly apt in the employment law
context which falls “squarely within the traditional police
powers of the states, and as such should not be disturbed
7  The Air Group makes the additional argument that
Gary’s state law claim is impliedly preempted under the
21
lightly.”  Branche, 342 F.3d at 1259 (citation omitted).  
We therefore agree with the Eleventh Circuit that Botz
went too far in expanding ADA preemption.  Instead, the
operative question remains whether the state law claim is
related to airline prices, routes, or services.  Because, as we
earlier acknowledged, the elements of airline prices and
routes are not in issue on this appeal, we hold that Gary’s
state law whistleblower claim is not “related to” the “service
of an air carrier” within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. §
41713(b)(1).  Hence, Gary’s retaliation claim is not
preempted by the ADA as amended by the WPP. 
The order of the District Court will be reversed and the
matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.7
doctrines of field and conflict preemption.  We decline to find
his claim so preempted.
In general, the existence of an express preemption
provision supports the inference that there is no implied
preemption.  See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280,
289 (1995); Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 166 (3d Cir.
2004).
With respect to conflict preemption, the Supreme Court
has left open the possibility that a federal law could provide for
both express and conflict preemption.  See Freightliner, 514
U.S. at 289.  However, courts of appeals in general have been
extremely reluctant to infer conflict preemption in the face of an
express preemption provision.  See, e.g., Horn, 376 F.3d at 166.
 The Air Group argues that CEPA should be preempted because
it serves as an obstacle to employees’ reporting safety violations
to the FAA.  That argument is flawed, however, because CEPA
and the WPP are not reporting statutes but are rather parallel
remedial statutes designed to protect airline employees who are
fired in retaliation for whistleblowing activities.  See Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496-97 (1996) (no conflict
preemption in the case of parallel state and federal statutory
remedies for the same conduct and harm).
